O ver the past decade, my colleagues and I have been assigned the task of making relatively speedy assessments of the policy and investment environments affecting small businesses in places as diverse as Russia, Haiti, Bolivia, Kuwait, Macedonia, and the West Bank and Gaza. We have generally found that the best introduction to how culture, law, and local financial markets affect small enterprises in these places has been to first see the small business entrepreneurs and to ask them what they think. From these meetings at hundreds of small companies in such varied places, the single most striking impression is how similar they all are. Indeed, it seems that the culture of small business entrepreneurship is so strong as to transcend the cultures of countries and ethnicities.
Just as the aspirations of entrepreneurs appear universal, so do their problems. They complain in a common voice of a lack of access to longterm, affordable capital, particularly from conventional sources. The most promising entrepreneurs that we see are also aware of their lack of the full technical and managerial know-how it takes to realize their aspirations. Based on the assumption of these similarities, it is our hope that certain policies and practices that have been successfully applied to small business development abroad will be of some use to those of you focusing your efforts on small business growth in rural America.
That said, I would like to first describe what our organization is and does, and then move on to a description of some of the small enterprise development strategies being pursued in developing and transitional economies. I would then like to go back to our model and discuss it within the broader context of equity financing as a small business development tool, particularly as it may relate to rural America.
THE SEAF MODEL
The Small Enterprise Assistance Funds (SEAF) is a private, multilateral development finance organization specializing in the promotion of small, entrepreneurial enterprises. We are a nonprofit organization, registered under Section 501(c)(3) of the United States Internal Revenue Code. What we do is manage several small business equity funds and operate them according to commercial terms.
Fund management
We currently manage eight funds in Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Latin America. Each fund is capitalized at a level of between $5 million and $17 million, though we are aiming at full capitalization for each fund at a minimum of $10 million. Each fund is managed by local staff through local offices in the country of investment and invests exclusively in locally owned small enterprises.
Typical investments
Our funds typically invest new capital in existing, generally early stage or young, businesses. These businesses generally employ 10 to 100 people. Prior to our investment, the owners' equity is generally in the range of $100,000 to $500,000, and they generally have annual sales of between $250,000 and $750,000. They are, for the most part, growth-oriented businesses. A number of businesses in the SEAF portfolios now have annual revenues in the range of $5 million to $15 million, three to five years after investment.
In most cases, the chief managing officer of the investee enterprise is also the majority shareholder. It is that person on whom much of our due diligence is performed, and on which our bet is ultimately placed. The types of investments we look for are not so much distinguished by growth or potential growth in their sector. Rather, they are distinguished by the promise of growth that will follow as the result of putting together a good entrepreneur with appropriate financing and the nonfinancial assistance we also provide.
Current portfolio companies
Among our companies are a printing and prepress company in Croatia, an internet service provider in Poland, an exporter of wool sweaters in Peru, a producer of door and window frames in Russia, and an ice cream manufacturer in Bulgaria. We also have a Polish manufacturer of hand-held ultraviolet light meters that tell you how long you can stay safely exposed to the sun if you use a sunscreen with a particular SPF. Only rarely have we invested in businesses engaged in retail sales. Nor are we looking primarily for high-tech companies.
As of mid-September, our funds had invested in about 120 of these companies. Our average investment is approximately $225,000, probably the lowest level of direct equity financing by any fund in the regions in which we work. All of our investments have a common-share equity component leading the transaction. Often we combine our equity infusion with a subordinated shareholder loan. We do no straight lending.
SEAF equity participation
On average our equity participation in a business is for about 38 percent of shares. Only on rare occasions are investments for less than 25 percent or more than 49 percent of shares. We build in significant approval rights and we want a significant voice in the running of the company. We normally do not take majority positions in our investees nor do we place our own officers in management positions within the investees. We believe that small business entrepreneurs work best for themselves.
SEAF fund performance
In assessing the performance of the SEAF funds, it is important to bear in mind that, while we believe the model is showing some real promise, our funds are young. SEAF's investment strategy calls for investments normally to be held for five to six years before exit. Our fund in Poland, CARESBAC-Polska, is the only SEAF fund to have completed five full years of operations and the only SEAF fund to have begun to exit investments. We are encouraged that CARESBAC-Polska was among the first direct equity investment funds of any size in Central and Eastern Europe to pay a dividend to its investors. It achieved net earnings in its fourth, fifth, and sixth years, in advance of any substantial number of exits and, in 1997, with total capital of $17 million, earned a pretax profit just short of $1 million.
Of CARESBAC-Polska's 41 completed investments, three of its earlier investments resulted in bankruptcies. In addition to these three involuntary exits, our Polish fund has recently exited five investments voluntarily. The weighted average internal rate of return (IRR) on these five exited investments is approximately 24 percent. While this performance is heartening, we, of course, have a number of investments in Poland from which it will be more difficult to achieve liquidity than it has been in the earlier exits. Furthermore, our operating costs are comparatively high, a key issue which will be addressed later in this paper.
We also take some encouragement in seeing that about half of the seven younger SEAF funds, in terms of revenues from investees, are performing as well as or better than the Polish fund was for the same period of operation. Thus far, out of 120 investments, we have had a total of seven bankruptcies. Most of these occurred early on and were the result of simply failing to practice the model that we preach. Still, we are fairly pleased with this low number.
SMALL BUSINESS PROMOTION IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Similar to the small business funds in discussion or in operation in rural America, SEAF was created to address a failure of private financial markets to provide equity financing at these levels. For this reason, we have sought our initial capital from publicly funded sources. In our case, sources include bilateral and multilateral development institutions like these: the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank (IFC), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and their equivalent agencies in Western Europe. The purpose of these institutions is, or should be, to address such market failures. Our job is to help them fulfill this purpose by providing them with vehicles to invest at levels lower than their structures allow them to do on a costeffective basis. Although most of these institutions are direct shareholders in the funds we manage, none of our investors has preapproval rights on investments.
Most of the institutions whose resources we invest pursue a broad spectrum of economic development programs, of which small business development is one part-often a very small part. SEAF is but one part-again, often a very small part-of their small business development programs. The small enterprise strategies of the EBRD, the IDB, the World Bank and IFC, USAID, and other international development institutions can be divided into three main areas: policy and institutional reform, company-level assistance, and financial markets and mechanisms.
Policy and institutional reform
Policy and institutional reform is accomplished primarily through specialized organizations and consultants working with finance ministries, industry ministries, central banks, local and national courts, and other public sector agencies in the host country. This work focuses on reducing irrational, capricious, and excessive regulatory requirements. It works with courts to improve the speed, effectiveness, and fairness of judicial review and registration processes. A large part of the effort in this area is, of course, devoted to streamlining tax regimes and introducing tax incentives to stimulate business growth.
Company level assistance
Company level assistance programs include business centers that prepare business plans, management and worker training programs, technical consultancies, exchange and travel programs, volunteer experts, databases to provide trade linkages, and programs bringing young MBAs to work with small companies at local wage rates. Our observation, after seeing and often working with many such programs in a wide variety of venues, is that some business centers work, some do not. Some training programs work, some do not. Some volunteers add great value and some do not. The overwhelming impression is that the critical factor in the success or failure of these efforts lies less in the designing of the programs than in the seriousness and competence of the individuals or organizations that implement them. Almost all of them have something important to offer a small business if they are competently run.
Small business development
Small business development programs directed toward financial markets focus a considerable portion of their work on training bankers in project assessment and other aspects of small business lending. In most developing and transition countries, whether there is a liquidity shortage or not, bankers are accustomed to lending almost exclusively to businesses closely connected to the bank or to businesses pledging relatively liquid collateral, often at several times the value of the loan. The international development institutions have also been active in helping countries to establish both laws and financial intermediaries to provide for leasing, factoring, equity financing, and other nonbank financial services.
Equity financing for small businesses, however, only recently has begun to be seen as a fundamental item on the slate of small business support programs. There are various reasons for this. Among them is the realization, at long last, that you cannot finance the small business sector of a country on debt alone. In essence, the small business sector has its own balance sheet, and, in developing and transition economies, unless new equity capital is brought in, there generally is insufficient existing equity in the local environment to keep that balance sheet healthy.
Even with its current greater popularity, there still is very little small business equity being provided by the international institutions. For example, the EBRD was established a decade ago as something of a combination World Bank and IFC for the former communist countries. Contrary to assumptions at the beginning of this decade, it has been increasingly evident that private, small-scale and medium-scale enterprises have played a role as important, or perhaps more important than, the privatization of state industries, at least in the more successful economies of the region.
Furthermore, survey after survey has shown that small businesses in the region consider their greatest constraint to growth to be the lack of access to long-term investment capital. The portion of the banking industry in the region that has not failed entirely has largely failed to provide small business lending beyond relatively short periods. Yet, of EBRD's total of more than $17 billion in capital, it has placed no more than $60 million in small enterprise equity funds in the region.
MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT FUND
One member among the international financial institutions appears to be taking the lead in small enterprise equity. The Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is a $1.5 billion special fund managed by the IDB. It has a relatively broad mandate and considerable flexibility to promote private sector development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Last February, the MIF sponsored a conference in Washington titled "The Next Step in Development: Equity for Entrepreneurial Enterprises." Attendance at the conference was three times what the MIF had expected.
At the conference, the chief officer of the MIF announced that, henceforth, a major focus of the MIF would be the development and financing of small enterprise equity funds, funds to invest in businesses with annual sales of less than $5 million. The MIF also distributed a position paper in which it announced its interest in providing up to 50 percent of the equity capital for funds in three distinct categories: venture capital, development capital, and hands-on capital. In exploring what sort of equity funds may be appropriate for rural America, the MIF categories are particularly useful.
Venture capital
Venture capital for small enterprises, as defined by the MIF, seeks to identify highperformance companies in high-growth sectors. These funds will generally have uneven portfolios with high return investments compensating for losses. They will invest in enterprises with projected IRRs of 35 percent or more and look to exits through initial public offerings for a significant portion of their portfolios. The MIF is looking for these funds to invest in amounts of between $500,000 and $1 million per company. The purpose of the venture capital funds is to grow promising companies, to attract foreign capital, foreign technology, and even foreign management expertise, and to feed local stock markets. The MIF is looking for a 15 percent plus return on its investments in these funds and assumes its coinvestors in these funds will be primarily looking for market level returns.
Developmental capital
Development capital funds, by contrast, are far less return-oriented. They are more specifically focused on depressed geographical areas and on more targeted developmental or environmental benefits. They invest in amounts between $50,000 and $250,000. They particularly seek opportunities to build the capacity of local community development organizations. These development funds are relatively high risk and low return. They are expected to produce returns to the MIF and other investors of around 5 percent, primarily from returns on exits through management buy-backs. Coinvestors with the MIF in these funds will generally be other development institutions, local governments, socially responsible investors, and nonprofit organizations. The Nature Conservancy, for example, has recently established one such fund with capital from the MIF.
Hands-on capital
The third category, hands-on capital is essentially the model practiced by SEAF. Hands-on funds form close partnerships with a broad range of small enterprises. They provide intensive business assistance in virtually all areas. They assist their investees both directly through fund staff and in cooperation with a variety of business support programs, such as the training and volunteers programs mentioned earlier. They focus on formalizing the procedures and the accounting and legal matters of businesses. They assist directly in marketing research and marketing strategy. They often help negotiate new financing from other sources, both prior to and at the exit. Most exits from these businesses will be from management buy-backs of the fund's shares or from sales to strategic partners. Investors in these funds are looking for a pretax return of around 10 percent.
The purpose of the hands-on fund is to build local entrepreneurial capacity, to promote a local culture of equity investment, to create new employment opportunities, and to mobilize debt capital of local banks. No less importantly, these hands-on funds are intended to help build model companies that operate transparently and in accordance with a high standard of business practice. The demonstration effect of such businesses in a local community provides powerful encouragement to other potential entrepreneurs as well as to the community at large. Recognizing the importance of this demonstration effect, hands-on funds seek to achieve relatively even portfolios with few losses, rather than a small number of highly profitable investments with a greater number of bankruptcies.
The MIF is looking to this hands-on approach to small business equity as the main thrust of its equity program. This is also the model on which the IFC of the World Bank is now focusing its new ventures in small equity. It is this notion of hands-on capital that returns us to rural America.
SEAF WORKSHOP
In October 1997, with a grant from the Ford Foundation, SEAF brought together in Washington a dozen of SEAF's local investment officers from places such as Bulgaria, Poland, and Peru. These local investment officers from abroad were then joined in the workshop by an equal number of investment officers from member organizations of the Community Development Venture Capital Alliance (CDVCA) who had come from places such as northeast Minnesota, rural Maine, and inner-city Philadelphia. What we found was that the problems faced by SEAF's officers and their investees were remarkably similar to those faced by the investees and the investment officers of the CDVCA funds, particularly those CDVCA funds using equity instruments. An observer from the SBIC program of the SBA attended the workshop. At present, the SBIC program is focusing considerable efforts and attention on the need to bring a more hands-on kind of investment vehicle to depressed rural areas and the inner cities. The SBA is exploring what kinds of methods, investors, and fund mangers it would take to create such vehicles.
In our view, what the Multilateral Investment
Fund, the IFC, some members of the CDVCA, the SBA, and SEAF are all pursuing is a new kind of equity investment vehicle. The version of equity investment being pursued should not be seen as an aberration of conventional venture capital. Rather, it is a separate model with distinctly different purposes, processes, and internal economics.
International challenges
The source of these distinctions is the reality that small businesses, particularly in economically depressed areas, suffer from more than a lack of access to equity capital and long-term subordinated debt. They also lack access or exposure to new technologies, to sophisticated management techniques, often to sufficiently skilled labor, and to healthy local markets for their products and services. In Central and Eastern Europe, entrepreneurs were systematically deprived of the knowledge of free-market practices until this decade. They grew up in environments where there were no business programs and few, if any, business role models. There was virtually no relating of costs to price or even of supply to demand, and there was a notion of marketing characterized, more or less, by the attitude that "The customer is always a nuisance." Similarly, small business entrepreneurs from middle-class Latin America often grew up in business environments controlled by the state or by a few wealthy families. Middle-class aspirants could not afford to go abroad where wealthier young people went to take their MBAs.
While many entrepreneurs in these regions are bursting with pent-up entrepreneurial zeal, they often need help in virtually the full range of business fundamentals. They need an equity partner to "hold their hands" through the process of building a company.
Rural U.S. issues
This condition may not be dissimilar from that of entrepreneurs in rural America. However, while most of the countries in which SEAF works do not have a long tradition of private entrepreneurship and suffer from comparatively weak economies and legal systems, our companies also have the additional advantage of an inexpensive labor force which is relatively welleducated. Even more significantly, the businesses in which we invest generally face nothing like the daunting competition faced by small enterprises in the United States. Rural America competes with the most sophisticated business environments in the world just down the road. If it is hard work for our Polish pickle processor to market pickles in Poland and in Central Europe, how much more difficult it must be for a food processor in the Mississippi Delta? As the knowledge gap between large urban and small rural increases, the barriers to entry for small businesses increase, perhaps almost logarithmically. This is why small, rural businesses, in and around Main Street USA, may need their hands held just as much as, or sometimes more than, for example, our Bulgarian and Peruvian investees.
HANDS-ON EQUITY FUND SUPPORT NETWORK
A small hands-on equity fund, with a comparatively large portfolio of small investments, needs, of course, many hands. In Poland, we have 21 people in three offices dealing with our 35 remaining investments. These people provide direct assistance in cost accounting, in identifying new markets, in establishing financial controls, in handling client relations, and in any other areas where their experience gives them an opportunity to add nonfinancial value. They are backed up by a small team in our Washington office. That team conducts telephone and Internet research related to market information, equipment and materials supply, product standards, and other aspects of the business of our investees. Many business issues related to these and other areas are simply matters of common sense rather than specific technical knowledge. As an objective observer of the entrepreneur's activities, the fund's investment officer is in a position to identify such common-sense issues.
Hands-on investment volunteers
Most of our local investment officers and analysts are young. They are primarily bright and highly numerate young local nationals. They work side by side with a small number of U.S.-trained MBAs. However, when a situation calls for technical expertise beyond their knowledge, they then go out to see what is available, affordable, and useful among the business centers, training programs, volunteer agencies, and other resources.
For example, we have arranged for more than 200 volunteer consultancies in which senior U.S. and Western European business people, who are often retired, work directly with our portfolio companies on a pro bono basis. Typically these volunteers provide such services as the preparation of marketing plans, the design of brochures, the pricing and selection of equipment and raw materials, and the revision of the management structures of businesses. Every time we identify a need for one of these volunteers, we tap into databases of three agencies in the United States that have a total of about 21,000 volunteers, most of whom are called upon less frequently than they or the agencies would wish. We also go to several similar European volunteer agencies that offer a combined total of about 15,000 available volunteers.
Both overseas and in the United States, the reputation of volunteer business consultants is mixed. There is often a broad gap in the scale and the sophistication of experience between the volunteer executive and the small business entrepreneur. Often this gap is not bridged until somewhere near the last days of the consultancy. Here, the presence of a hands-on investment professional is crucial. This third person should know both the business of the entrepreneur and the world of the volunteer. They are in a position to see that the consultancy works, ensuring that neither the entrepreneur nor the volunteer advisor wastes the other's time. They should make sure that the volunteer's advice is relevant and realistic for the investee business, and that the entrepreneur follows through on the advice. In the SEAF case, for example, it is our 40 percent ownership in the investee that puts us in a position to influence positively the outcome of the consultancy.
Role of the volunteer
As an example of one of these volunteer consultancies, the former CFO of a Fortune 100 firm visited eight of our investees in Poland for three days each in succession. With each company he did streamlined assessments of cost accounting practices and management information systems. Not long after he started, the owner of one of the first businesses he saw called to thank us for sending him, and to say that our volunteer had just saved him half a manyear of labor in a key position. This savings represented a significant sum for that particular entrepreneur at a time when he could not have afforded a similar paid consultant. Nor would he have likely known how to find the volunteer. In a case like this, the investor, in the person of the SEAF investment officer, was responsible for providing significant nonfinancial value to the investee in a form which both the entrepreneur and the fund could afford. Our role as an equity partner was to identify the volunteer from among various agencies, to brief the volunteer on each company, and finally, to follow up with each company visited to see that the volunteer's recommendations were implemented.
We feel fortunate to have had access to such rich resources of volunteers for our work abroad. However, it appears that there is not universal happiness with the quality and availability of such consultants provided by volunteer programs in the United States. Certainly, we have seen that privately run agencies have an advantage over government run programs. It also appears that the very agencies we work with are all considering the opening of their rosters of volunteers to domestic projects. A number of individual volunteers with whom we have worked have confirmed their willingness to provide their services at home. In our view, this particular form of volunteerism remains a vast untapped resource in the United States. While individual small business entrepreneurs are unlikely to be able to change this situation systemically, investors and fund managers of development-oriented investment funds will be in a prime position to encourage the mobilization of volunteer business expertise and to contribute to its success.
ECONOMICS OF HANDS-ON INVESTMENT
Hands-on investment funds being directed at smaller companies must take into account that a $250,000 equity investment will normally be more labor-intensive on the part of the investors than a $2.5 million investment in a more sophisticated company and environment. Consequently, proportional transactional and post-investments cost will be significantly higher for hands-on funds than for more conventional venture capital or private equity. SBICs and venture capital funds in the United States generally invest in amounts rarely less than $1 million. The current average venture capital investment in the United States is in the range of $5 million to $6 million. These funds are generally capitalized at a level of $30 million and upward. Annual management fees for their operations are normally from 2 percent to 2.5 percent of total committed capital. That is to say, the annual operating overhead of a $30 million SBIC is normally around $750,000. SBIC and venture capital funds generally look to produce returns for their investors that are superior to 15 percent and closer to 25 percent in boom years.
By contrast, SEAF's funds, the hands-on funds pursued by the MIF, and a growing number of development-oriented small business equity funds, which are now being either designed, raised, or managed by other institutions, have a different set of numbers. These funds are intended to reach down to investment levels below $500,000, where that amount constitutes a significant part of early stage or expansion capital, rather than just seed financing. These funds are typically being capitalized at a level nearer $10 million in order to build portfolios with manageable numbers of investments. Their annual operating costs are in the range of 6 percent to 9 percent, and their projected pretax returns to investors are in typically about 10 percent.
As an example, our fund in Poland runs annual operating costs of between 7 percent and 8 percent of committed capital, which is similar to SEAF's other funds. This is three or four times the cost ratio of conventional SBICs and venture funds. However, these operating costs are not simply a generous fee to SEAF, the fund manager. Rather, they are the cost of the particular business in which we are engaged and they are set forth annually in line-item budgets approved by our investors. This higher cost ratio represents primarily the cost of people working to provide continual postinvestment assistance to a large portfolio of investees throughout the life of each investment. Again, it results from the reality that a $250,000 investment a development context will almost invariably be more labor intensive that a $2.5 million investment in a more standard market context.
There is an argument to be made that the higher costs of hands-on, developmental funds contribute significantly to a reduction in the risk of the investors in the fund.
Venture capital uses a formula of picking businesses, among which there may be an equal number of complete failures and successful exits at high multiples of the original investment. Hands-on capital, by contrast, builds businesses through intensive assistance and close partnerships with entrepreneurs. The mere fact that there are fund personnel on hand to help the businesses when they are in trouble should eliminate a significant portion of risk.
Investors in hands-on equity funds
Despite the foregoing, a 7 percent to 8 percent fee will generally preclude a fund from raising return-oriented capital, as will a projected return to investors of 10 percent, particularly when compared with the 35 percent returns normally projected-if less often achieved-in the venture capital industry. The difficulty of raising return-oriented capital becomes even greater when standard risk adjustments are applied to the hands-on funds' projections. Therefore, these substantially higher operating costs and significantly lower returns explain why investors in development-oriented funds are a relatively rare and diverse group. To get equity capital into developing countries and into small rural businesses in a realistic way and in significant quantities, investors must be sought who share the purpose of financing entrepreneurship in these economically disadvantaged environments.
As has been the case in small business development overseas, the lead in this kind of developmental investing will likely need to be taken by public institutions and agencies. Private investors in development-oriented equity funds will most likely be those seeking a modest return accompanied by nonfinancial benefits. Among these nonfinancial, or collateral, benefits may be access to information on a rural or emerging market. Benefits also may be the satisfaction of legal obligations, such those contained in the Community Reinvestment Act, or related to tax incentives. A collateral benefit to an investor who puts $1 million or $2 million into a hands-on rural equity fund may simply be an attractive page in the annual report to advertise its social responsibility or its presence in a particular area. When combined with a realistic return in the range of 8 percent to 12 percent, these collateral benefits may be sufficient to warrant investment on the part of a corporation or high-wealth individual. Just as in any other form of fund-raising, however, the representation of such combined financial and nonfinancial benefits will need to be made specifically, convincingly, and with the investors' interests thoroughly considered.
Hands-on fund managers
In addition to "Who are the investors?" the other looming question for hands-on, development-oriented equity investment in small enterprise is "Who will run such funds?" Logically, if a fund manager has a large staff operating a $10 million fund with a relatively modest return, the carried interest on such a fund, given the delay in its receipt and the number of persons to share in it, will not provide the primary incentive for individual investment officers. It will, however, be attractive to many talented people who like living in certain exotic environments abroad or rural areas in the United States, particularly to those who derive a particular satisfaction from helping to build small businesses. The experience of SEAF, CDVCA, and others is that such people exist in far greater numbers than one might expect. We see people with impressive resumes in search of such nonfinancial rewards.
In August of last year, SEAF made a presentation to a group of about 40 MBA candidates at the University of Chicago. A recent article in the press reported that the average Chicago MBA receives a compensation package of about $120,000 during the first year out of business school. We disclosed to these students that SEAF's compensation packages for recent business school graduates are generally no more than half that figure. It is heartening that we have received seven resumes from that group of 40 since last summer. One Chicago MBA candidate came by our offices recently for an interview. In that interview, she said that there was no problem at the University of Chicago in finding people who want to do this kind of work. The problem has been that there were no such investment vehicles being represented in the recruiting cycle of the school, and that this kind of development-oriented but financially sophisticated work was simply not being offered.
CONCLUSION
This student may have made a very significant point. Those of us who are practicing handson investment, development venture capital, community development equity finance, or whatever rubric may be most appropriate for the activity described herein, are continually confronted by the assumption that there are no investors willing to come into this kind of relatively high-cost, low-return, and, at least, perceived high-risk fund. We are just as often told that it is not realistic to expect to find competent people willing to make the sacrifices, or, at least, perceived sacrifices, necessary to run these funds.
An argument can be made that these assumptions have not been convincingly tested, despite the experience of organizations such as Kentucky Highlands Corporation, Northeast Ventures in Minnesota, and SEAF. The viability of this unconventional equity model is now being tested and vindicated in a number of places such as rural Kentucky, Minnesota, and Poland. However, there remains no such institutionalized notion of a distinct category of investment vehicle that is consistently and widely recognized. There may simply be too much heterogeneity among the existing development-oriented small business funds using equity and venture capital techniques.
While different venues will call for some variations in size, costs, methods, and returns, there is nonetheless a basic model that may be emerging and which may have been in isolated practice for years in rural Kentucky and elsewhere. This basic model needs to be defined, developed, and institutionalized. Those who practice it need to meet and look at ways to perfect its performance. Just as importantly, they need to focus on defining the full range of collateral benefits to investors that this kind of investment offers. It may be that a modest return combined with such collateral benefits is inadequate to attract sufficient private equity capital for small enterprises in rural America. In that case, it may be necessary to define it and press for specific governmental support in the form of tax incentives or guarantees for investors, or through some other mechanism.
The reality remains that rural America, like rural Poland or urban Peru, cannot achieve economic and social progress without substantial growth in the small business sector. It is equally true that to attain that growth, the balance sheet of the small business sector will need more equity than rural entrepreneurs and conventional equity markets can provide. In order to attract new equity capital into rural small businesses, it will be necessary to define more thoroughly the specific vehicles through which such equity will flow. Only by defining the objectives and economics of such vehicles will it be possible to identify and obtain the resources necessary to put them in place.
